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COMMENTARY
The Power of the Psychiatric Excuse*
SEYmouR L. HALLECK, M.D.**
The power of the psychiatrist to influence the status quo is not
confined to his work with patients or to his public pronouncements re-
garding abnormality. Sometimes the psychiatrist takes a direct role
in helping the society make critical social decisions which effect the
stability of the society as well as the privileges and freedom of some of
its citizens. One of the most significant ways in which the psychiatrist
exerts such influence is by excusing selected individuals from meeting
certain obligations.
In a civilized society those who are severely ill are not required
to meet all of their obligations. A man with a high fever will not be
required to go to work. A boy with a crippling orthopedic condition
will not be required to serve in the armed forces. Because our society
looks upon some forms of emotional suffering as illness, we are also
willing at times to excuse the emotionally disturbed from fulfilling some
of their obligations. Sometimes, the psychiatrist is given the power to
officially sanction such an excuse. In other instances he only recom-
mends an excuse and the power to officially excuse rests with a judi-
cial agency. In spite of the apparent humanitarian basis of psychiatric
excuse-giving, I am convinced that this practice contributes to our
social ills. Most often psychiatric excuse-giving tends to strengthen
an oppressive status quo.
There are three major characteristics to psychiatric excuse-giving.
The first is selectivity. Only certain individuals are offered the oppor-
tunity of obtaining a psychiatric excuse. Usually an excuse is not even
considered unless the patient complains vehemntly about his suffering
or behaves in a bizarre or unreasonable manner. The person who
suffers quietly or the person who harbors bizarre thougts and keeps
them to himself is not likely to be found eligible for a psychiatric excuse.
The very act of requesting preferential treatment requires a certain
degree of aggressiveness on the part of the patient or in some cases
on the part of his attorney. Those who have most knowledge of the
laws and who are most aware of the availability of an excuse are most
likely to request an excuse and to receive it. A prestigious social posi-
tion and lots of money helps. Psychiatric excuses are rarely given to
members of lower socio-economic groups.
A second characteristic of psychiatric excuse-giving is that it puts
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the psychiatrist in a situation in which he must often be dishonest in
interpreting his opinions to the public. Most psychiatrists will identify
with their patient and will be eager to help him avoid what both parties
consider to be an overwhelming or unjust obligation. Such strong par-
tisanship destroys the psychiatrist's objectivity. Sometimes, it is true,
the psychiatrist can convince himself that his patient is too sick to
assume an obligation. At other times, however, he is not certain that
his patient is terribly ill but is tempted to offer a medical excuse
simply because it seems to offer a rational and humane solution to the
patient's problems. Even when the psychiatrist is convinced his patient
is ill, he has no objective means of determining whether the illness is
severe enough to have influenced the patient's conduct or capacities so
that the patient deserves to be treated in a privileged manner.
The third characteristic of psychiatric excuse-giving is that it
strengthens social systems. The person who is given an excuse is likely
to be an individual who would have confronted the system if he were
not excused. If he had been forced to fulfill his obligation, his plight
would have been such that it would have engendered cons'derable pub-
lic sentiment and concern. Once a person is excused from an obligation
on the basis of being too sick to assume it, society assumes that the
issue has been justly settled. And the excused person loses much of
his motivation to confront the system which is stressing him. The so-
ciety is then relieved of pressure to examine the oppresive nature of
the obligations which it imposes upon people and can avoid facing the
need to change the system which demands such obligations.
When excuses are sought from grave social responsibilities such as
carrying a child to term, being punished for a crime or serving in the
armed forces, the emotions engendered in all of us are usually so intense
as to obscure a rational examination of what is happening. The issues
involved in excuse giving are best clarified by examining the problem
from a more or less neutral standpoint. I will try to describe how the
process of excuse-giving effects a relatively trivial social system, one in
which the consequences of intervention are not profound, either for the
system or for the individual.
Some Personal Experiences With Excuse-Giving In A Small Social
System
Students at the University of Wisconsin who wish to obtain dormi-
tory housing are required to sign a contract which obliges them to pay
for room and board for a full academic year. The contract is made
either with the University itself or with private owners of dormitories
who have been licensed by the University to provide student housing.
A certain number of students in the course of an academic year become
dissatisfied with their living arrangements. Sometimes they do not like
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the dormitory itself. Sometimes they cannot get along with their room-
mate or with other individuals on the dormitory floor. Or sometimes
they make new friends of the same or opposite sex with whom they
prefer to live. The student can change his residence only if he pays
off his contract, sells it to another student or obtains a medical excuse
from his obligation.
If a student becomes severely ill and has to leave school he is usually
excused from his housing contract simply upon his request. If his ill-
ness is not severe, however, the situation requires a little more investi-
gation. Sometimes a student will develop a severe allergy or a condition
like diabetes and will need special living arrangements or special food.
In such situations excuses are generally obtained painless.y. But in
general, there are not many medical conditions among young people
which justify breaking a housing contract. What happens most fre-
quently is that the student who desperately wants to change his housing
arrangements is tempted to argue that he is emotionally disturbed and
that being forced to live in a particular dormitory is contributing to
his level of emotional disturbance.
When I first began to work as Director of Student Psychiatry at
the University of Wisconsin I found that it was the practice of the
University Housing Bureau to honor any letter from a psychiatrist
recommending that a student be excused from dormitory contract obli-
gations. A student who wanted to change his residence had only to
find a psychiatrist who would write a note to the housing authorities
stating that the student was mentally ill and that if the student con-
tinued to live in that particular dormitory, he would become more
disturbed. The Wisconsin situation was not unique. Many other uni-
versities have honored psychiatric excuses in a similar manner and
some of them still do.
A certain number of students requested excuses directly from the
University Psychiatry Clinic rather than from private psychiatrists. In
reviewing their cases I began to realize that the possibility of obtaining
an excuse was highly dependent upon the social and moral biases of the
particular university-employed psychiatrist the student happened to
see. I also came to appreciate that psychiatrists who were connected
with the University Clinic were more likely to turn down a request
for an excuse than psychiatrists in private practice. In effect, students
who could afford to see a private practitioner had little-trouble in break-
ing their contracts. Sometimes letters recommending excuses were
written by physicians who had never even seen the student. In order
to minimize inequities in the excuse-giving process I convinced the
administration that all individuals requesting excuses should be ex-
amined by one individual. I persuaded them that I should be the only
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person who could sanction an ,excuse. By making this, seemingly wise
and fair decision I let myself in for some bitter experiences.
When I began reviewing all of the cases I soon appreciated that
those students who came to beg my indulgence were a special group.
They had taken the time to learn about the housing system and were
extremely aggressive in pursuing their own goals. They also seemed
to be people who were used to getting their own way. Their determi-
nation to be relieved of the obligation of fulfilling their housing con-
tract by any possible means (other than simply meeting the financial
obligations to which they had agreed) could be described as relentless
or grim.
A certain number of students who requested excuses did seem to be
seriously disturbed. Some had been in psychotherapy and some had
even been hospitalized for mental disorders. These students aroused
my sympathy. But those students who did not appear to be too dis-
turbed also aroused my sympathy. They seemed so unhappy in their
surroundings and argued so convincingly that they would be happier
if they could live elsewhere, that I was almost tempted to accede to
their requests.
At the beginning of my tenure I was quite liberal in writing excuses.
I wrote them for students who were experiencing mild depressions and
anxiety attacks and because their symptoms did seem to be relieved
following a change of environment I felt justified in having told the
authorities that these students were sick. Unfortunately, as more and
more students requested and received excuses, my policies led to the
housing administrator's becoming quite irritated with me. Every time
a student was excused from a contract, somebody lost money. The
University was able to incur the loss without too much pain but private
owners of dormitories were much more incensed.
Eventually I was forced to sharpen my criteria for offering excuses.
I decided I would not recommend them unless the patient was suffering
from a severe emotional disorder which seemed to be generated or
aggravated by his living situation. At this point I found it was very
difficult to stick to such criteria. I could not easily decide who was
terribly "sick" and who was not. Some students exaggerated the degree
of their suffering more than others. Some could present excellent so-
cial and humanitarian reasons for being released from an oppressive
situation but these students often seemed to have relative stable per-
sonalities. I never made a decision to excuse one person or not to
excuse another without feeling that it was an arbitrary decision. As I
reflect upon my practices of those years, I realize that my recommenda-
tions were probably as often based on the patient's charm or aggressive-
ness or how I was feeling that day as it was upon any psychiatric
insight. In short, my recommendations were dishonest. At varied times
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I tried to lighten my burden by involving other people in the excuse-
giving process so that a committee would make the final decision. These
efforts neither simplified my task nor relieved my conscience. Everyone
who became involved in the excuse-giving business eventually came to
feel as perplexed and dishonest as I did.
In the course of listening to students and administrators I began
to realize that there were a number of socially questionable practices
going on in our dormitories. Some landlords had set up highly arbi-
trary and oppressive rules. Some seemed totally unconcerned with the
emotional needs of students. Others never gave the students what they
promised them. I also began to wonder if it made sense to force a
17 or 18 year old youth who might never have seen a particular dormi-
tory to sign a contract obliging him to remain there for up to a year.
Faced with these considerations and the obvious frustrations of trying
to select which of many demanding students would be excused I radi-
cally altered the policy of the University Psychiatry Service. I simply
legislated psychiatric excuses from dormitory contract obligations out
of existence. I refused to write an excuse unless the student was so
disturbed that he had to leave school. I agreed to provide the housing
authorities with a psychiatric evaluation of any student who requested
an excuse but I insisted that excuse-giving was not a medical function
and refused to word my reports so as to providt direction to the
administration.
Before making such a step, I of course discussed the problem with
the University housing administrators. I told them of my frustrations
and of my feelings that difficult ethical situations were merely being
passed off to the psychiatrist. They were sympathetic but unmoved.
When I did make my decision to withdraw from the excuse-giving
process, the resistance of the housing administrators to my policy was
massive. They argued "that my own actions were arbitrary and disrup-
tive, and that they could never decide which students could be excused
without the benefits of medical judgments. They even for a time con-
sidered returning to the policy of honoring excuses from private psy-
chiatrists or from other counseling services on campus. I was able
to resist continued involvement in the excuse-giving business only by
maintaining an attitude of unrelenting stubborness.
It is my belief that my initial willingness to give excuses to selected
students prevented those students from confronting the University
administration with their dissatisfiaction with dormitory life and pre-
vented the administrators from looking at the conditions which were
creating dissatisfaction. When I stopped giving psychiatric excuses,
many changes in the management of dormitories began to take place.
The housing administrators became more aware of some of the problems
in the dormitories. Students began to make more demands for changes
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in their dormitories. I realize of course that some of these events were
brought about by the concurrent rising militancy of students, but I
am also convinced that if I had continued to serve as a source for
relieving pressure in the entire student housing system, these changes
would have come about more slowly. By performing what had seemed
to be a humanitarian function and by disguising a social problem as a
medical problem, I had actually helped the dormitory system resist
reform. I had served as an agent of the status quo.
Therapeutic Abortion
In American society a woman who finds herself carrying an un-
wanted pregnancy has several alternatives. She can carry the baby to
term and make the best of it. Or, she can seek out a criminal abortion-
ist who will terminate her pregnancy for a price. Or, if she can afford
it, she might take a brief vacation to a foreign country where she would
have little difficulty in obtaining a safe abortion. She can also try to
obtain a legal abortion in this country by proving she is sick enough to
have her pregnancy terminated on medical grounds.
While the situation is rapidly changing, therapeutic abortions are
still for the most part granted in this country only when doctors are
willing to make a formal statement that carrying a child to term will
seriously threaten -the mother's survival. Only a few states, as of this
writing, will sanction a therapeutic abortion in situations where he
mother's health rather than her very existence is threatened. In most
states doctors cannot recommend therapeutic abortions even if they
have strong certainties that the child will be born defective. Nor is
abortion usually sanctioned if the pregnancy is the result of incest or
rape. IA practice, doctors are usually willing to recommend therapeutic
abortion when a woman has such a severe heart, respiratory or urinary
disease that there would be a considerable risk of her dying if she
had to carry the child to term. It is much harder to know if abortions
are granted when there is reasonable certainty that carrying a child to
term will make the mother's health worse, but will not result in her
death. It is quite likely that many doctors recommend abortion in such
instances, but they usually do so quietly, and also, illegally.
Conceivably a woman might be so emotionally disturbed that there
would be a strong possibility of her killing herself if she were forced
to carry her child to term. In such instances recommendations for
therapeutic abortion are made by the psychiatrist. If the psychiatrist
believes abortion is justified, he is only required to submit a written
report stating that the patient's life will be gravely threatened by the
continuation of her pregnancy. In most hospitals this report is unlikely
to be seriously challenged by other psychiatrists, by the obstetrician
who does the abortion or any type of review board.
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At the present time it is very bard to know what criteria are actually
being utilized in granting therapeutic abortions on psychiatric grounds.
Policies differ from state to state and from hospital to hospital. Some
doctors will recommend therapeutic abortion only when they are abso-
lutely convinced that the patient is'gravely ill and suicidal. Others will
recommend it when there are far less ominus signs of psychological
disturbance. From my own experience and from the anecdotes I have
heard from colleagues, it seems clear that women who are granted
therapeutic abortions are a special group. Quite frequently they are
among the community elite. Not surprisingly, many are relatives of
physicians. It takes a certain knowledge of the law and familiarity with
psychiatrists to even know how to go about asking for a therapeutic
abortion on psychiatric grounds. The poor, the uneducated and the
black rarely ever make this request. For the most part, therapeutic
abortion on psychiatric grounds is a privilege afforded to upper middle
class whites.
When the psychiatrist writes an official report stating that a given
woman will endanger her life by carrying a child to term, he is on very
shaky grounds. Many women who may be seriously emotionally dis-
turbed and who are reluctant to have a baby will never contemplate
suicide. Their lives are in no danger at all. Other emotionally dis-
turbed women who find themselves with an unwanted pregnancy will
threaten suicide but it is quite difficult to evaluate the seriousness of
their threats. The psychiatrist generally knows that even the woman
who is sincerely threatening suicide can be treated by more traditional
means without having to resort to abortion. He also appreciates that
the suicidal patient, once she knew there were no other alternatives
available, would probably respond well to psychotherapy, drug therapy
or hospitalization.
A woman who is aware of the laws of her state and is looking for a
psychiatric abortion quickly learns that she must "talk suicide" if she
is to get her way. It is very easy for a person who sees herself faced
with an unwanted event and who knows that illness is a way out of
having to endure that event, to convince herself that she is ill. It
makes little difference whether she comes to do this consciously or
unconsciously. To the extent that the communication of personal suf-
fering becomes a means of avoiding the responsibility of carrying a
child to term, such a person is actually likely to feel more depressed
and more suicidal. When she assumes the role of illness she will feel
more sick. The psychiatrist can accelerate this process by either directly
or indirectly communicating to the patient that she must present grave
signs of illness before he can recommend abortion.
Many psychiatrists recommend therapeutic abortion for entirely
humanitarian reasons even when they are not convinced that the patient
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will destroy herself. But to do this they must state somewhere in their
report that the patient is suicidal. To salve their professional con-
sciences, such psychiatrists must in effect play a game with the patient
in which they subtly teach her (and usually she is an apt pupil) to
be as sick as she can and to say the'right words (I'll kill myself if I'm
forced to have this baby.") before they are willing to write a psychiatric
excuse. Once the patient has gone through a convincing display of her
"illness" she can have her abortion. A few doctors who are in a sense
more honest about their dishonesty will be even less scrupulous in
documenting the need for abortion. They will simply say that a woman
is suicidal even when they know she is not.
There are many reasons why a woman might not want to bring a
child into this world. Children may be an economic or psychological
burden. Sometimes the birth of an additional child within a family
or the birth of a single child out of wedlock can make a previously
adequate life seem intolerable. Many mothers bring unwanted children
into the world. A good many of these mothers if they had been aware
enough and determined enough could probably have convinced psy-
chiatrists that they were too sick to carry their child to term. For every
woman who receives a psychiatric abortion, there are probably a dozen
others whose plight is more tragic and whose emotional handicaps are
more serious. Viewed in this light, therapeutic abortion is not a medical
problem but a moral problem. No psychiatrist if he is honest with
himself will attest to skills which will enable him to distinguish between
the selfish, the practical, the idealistic or the irrational motivations
which bring a woman to request therapeutic abortion. Nor can he
describe any scientific criteria which tell him which unhappy woman
should have her pregnancy terminated and which should not. When
he recommends that abortion should be granted, he usually lies. It is a
kind lie, a dishonesty intended to make the world a little better, but
it is still a lie. Consider the following case.
A 24 year old woman came to see me requesting a therapeutic
abortion. She was in her -third month of pregnancy. The possi-
bility of receiving a therapeutic abortion was brought to her
attention by her psychiatrist who had been treating her in con-
ventional psychotherapy for about six months.
She was one of six children raised in a poverty stricken un-
happy home. As a child she remembered herself as having been
shy and frightened most of the time. Her father drank heavily
and at times would beat the children. Her mother was an in-
tensely religious woman who repeatedly harangued her children
as to the Virtues of piety and chastity. When the patient was 13
years old her father left the home. At this time she came to be
even more strongly dominated by the mother's puritanical in-
fluence.
Surprisingly, the patient did well as a student and was the
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only member of her family who managed to finish high school.
She worked as a secretary for two years, saved her money and
entered a teachers college. By virtue of continuing to work
nights and by saving every penny, she eventually managed to
obtain a teaching certificate and began working as an elementary
school teacher in a rural district. By this time the other children
had left home and the patient was the sole support of her mother.
After a year of working as a teacher she began to feel depressed.
She had few friends and rarely had the opportunity to go out
with members of the opposite sex. When she began to experi-
ence crying spells she consulted a psychiatrist. During the course
of her therapy she began to feel more confident, overcame some
of her shyness and started to date a few men. On one of these
dates she encountered an aggressive man who managed to get
her intoxicated and proceeded to forcefully have intercourse
with her. This was the patient's first and only sexual experience
and she became pregnant.
The patient knew that if she carried the baby to term she
would lose her job. There was no other source of financial sup-
port. She also feared that because of the moralistic attitude
prevalent in her community, that it would be extremely difficult
for her to ever obtain another teaching job. She had no idea of
what she would do with the baby. It seemed unlikely that her
mother would help her. In fact she feared that her mother
would totally reject her.
When I interviewed the patient I was very much aware that
she was experiencing profund emotional anguish. At the same
time, however, I was impressed with her character and her psy-
chological strength. At no time did she threaten suicide. She
was only mildly demanding and certainly not hystrionic. There
was little doubt in my mind that she would not commit suicide
but I was also concerned with the deep tragedy of her situation.
The position I found myself in with this patient was not
too different from that which the psychiatrist usually encounters
when he evaluates patients for therapeutic abortion. The most
humane and decent thing I could do was to recommend abortion.
Yet, this recommendation would have to be a lie. I had the
choice of lying outrightly and saying that the patient was suicidal
(which she was not) or I could have trained her to talk about
suicide and thus have bribed my conscience a little. Whatever I
did in this situation would have been morally wrong.
In addition to having to compromise his own morality, the psy-
chiatrist who recommends therapeutice abortion must also be concerned
with the effect of his recommendation upon the patient. Many patients
who request therapeutic abortion do not have the personality strengths
of the patient I have discussed. Granting excuses to emotionally dis-
turbed individuals may, in the long run, be harmful to them. While
the danger of depression following a therapeutic abortion is probably
not great, the learning experience involved in obtaining a psychiatric
excuse from meeting an obligation may be quite damaging. The ex-
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cused patient in effect learns to use her "illness" as a means of avoiding
similar kinds of obligations. She also learns to view herself as a person
who should not be held responsible for her actions.
Even though the psychiatrist who helps a woman obtain a therapeu-
tic abortion may view himself as performing a humane act, the overall
impact of such excuse-giving upon the social order does not favor
humanistic goals. Helping a few women find an easy way out of a
social obligation is of no help whatsoever to the millions of women
who risk their lives in the hands of criminal abortionists or who bring
unwanted children into the world. Furthermore, the selected granting
of therapeutic abortions is in effect a safety valve, or mechanism for
neutralizing some of the forces which would otherwise confront the
existing system with the need for social change. If the society had to
witness the tragedy of highly disturbed women bringing unwanted
children into the world, they might examine the total issue of any
woman bringing an unwanted child into the world. If women of
position, sophistication and power were not able to easily rid themselves
of unwanted pregnancies, they would be more tempted to fight to
change existing abortion laws. If physicians could not occasionally
salve their consciences by legally aborting some of their patients and
friends, they too would be more willing to fight to change existing
abortion laws. The very presence and use of therapeutic abortion
laws serve as a kind of social opiate. Excuse-giving masks the pain
but it does nothing to cure a malignant social process.
A number of psychiatrists, social scientists and attorneys have ar-
gued that our society should liberalize its laws governing therapeutic
abortion. They insist that if abortion were granted when pregnancy
represents a threat to the mother's health or when pregnancy was the
result of incest or rape, the problem could be handled in a convenient
and humane manner. Yet, the experience of a state like Colorado, a
state that has initiated such a liberal law, has not been salutary. In
Colorado, therapeutic abortion for psychiatric reasons has continued
to be available only to a limited segment of the population. Permission
for abortion is still dependent on the liberalism and benevolence of the
particular examining physician. Sometimes the decision to permit or
not permit an abortion has been determined solely by the number of
cases which the local hospital could comfortably handle. Psychiatrists
have still had to be less honest in speculating as to the effects of child-
bearing on mental health. And some are completely disillusioned with
a liberalized system that may have served to obscure social problems
even more powerfully than the older, more restirctive systems.
A number of physicians, attorneys and legislators have come to an
obvious conclusion. They believe that every woman should have the
right to have an unwanted pregnancy terminated. They insist that
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rules governing abortion shopld not be part of the criminal law but
that decision for abortion should simply be made by the patient and a
qualified doctor. They recommend (and in a few states have actually
passed) legislation which allows for abortion upon the patient's request
providing a doctor believes that such a procedure will help and not
harm the patient. This seems to be an indirect but effective means of
legalizing abortion. Our society is in desperate need of such legislation
-in all fifty of our states. We are also in need of sufficient facilities to
provide the opportunity for abortion to the poor as well as the rich.
Unfortunately, even those states that have in effect legalized abortion
have not provided the funds or the personnel which would make quick,
inexpensive abortions available to all citizens. No woman should have
to go through the experience of having a criminal abortion or of bring-
ing an unwanted child into the world. Nor should she have to humili-
ate herself by labelling herself mentally ill and non-responsible in order
to spare herself the first two agonies.
Criminal Responsibility
In order for a person to be found guilty of having committed a
crime, there must be proof that he intended to commit a crime. Our
society has always been guided by the principal that it will not punish
where it cannot impose blame. Without criminal intent or "mens rea"
an offender cannot be designated a criminal. Illegal acts can be com-
mitted without intent. Sometimes the legal code is violated as a result
of accident. Sometimes a person may commit a crime under duress
or in self defense. And usually a child under seven is not considered
to be mature enough to have developed criminal intent.
Since the 17th century society has accepted the belief that some
individuals who break the law are so incapacitated or deranged by
mental illness that their criminal behavior cannot be viewed as inten-
tional. An effort has been made to excuse such disturbed offenders from
assuming responsibility for their criminal actions. In most jurisdictions
the rule by which a mentally disturbed person is adjudged mentally
responsible or non-responsible is derived from 19th century English
law. The rule enunciated in the McNaughten Case over a hundred
years ago states that, "To establish a defense on the grounds of insanity,
it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act the
party accused was laboring under such a defect from disease of the
mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing
or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing wrong."
Various alternatives to the McNaughten Rule have been proposed,
the most notable of which was enunciated in 1954 by Judge Bazelon,
Chief Justice of the United States Court of Appeals in the Distirct of
Columbia. In ruling on the case of Monte Durham, The Court of Appeals
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said; "The rule we now hold is simply that an accused is not criminally
responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or
mental defect. We use 'disease' in the sense of a condition which is
considered capable of improving or deteriorating. ,We use 'defect' in
the sense of a condition which is not considered capable of either im-
proving or deteriorating and which may be congenital or the result
of an injury or the residual effect of the physical or mental disease."
The Durham Decision although initially hailed as a progressive step
by psychiatrists, has never gained much popularity in this country.
The McNaughten Rule or the so-called "right or wrong" test is still
the commonest rule used to determine whether selected offenders should
be given a psychiatric excuse from criminal responsibility.
Psychiatric excuse-giving for criminal responsibility has received a
great deal of public attention. In this instance the psychiatrist must
appear in court and carry out his work in public. He will be cross
examined by hostile attorneys. Often psychiatrists will openly take
adversarial positions, some arguing that an offender should be excused
and some arguing that he shouldn't. Any disagreement between psy-
chiatrists is likely to recieve considerable publicity.
The public spectacle of the insanity trial, in providing superb emo-
tional and intellectual diversion for the public, also exposes the psychia-
trist at his worst possible moment. More often than not he ends up
looking like a fool or a charlatan. Psychiatrists regularly find them-
selves forced to take theoretical positions which contradict the concep-
tual basis of their practices outside of the courtroom. Other participants
in the proceedings are equally frustrated. Lawyers and judges find
psychiatric pronouncements confusing and sometimes unintelligible.
And the disturbed offender rarely receives the kind of treatment that
would enable him to return to society as a free and useful citizen.
No matter how it comes out, the insanity trial rarely leads to any sort
of humanistic accomplishment.
Perhaps the whole system would be more tolerable if the oppor-
tunity to obtain a psychiatric excuse for a criminal act were available
to all men regardless of race, social or economic status. Unfortunately
most disturbed offenders never have the opportunity to raise the plea
of not guilty by reason of insanity. Unless there has been a spectacu-
lar crime involving murder or extreme violence, even the most disor-
ganized offender is unlikely to be advised to plead not guilty by reason
of insanity. Even when the potential consequences of a conviction
are grim, the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity will not always
be raised. The personality disturbance of the offender is not likely
to be the major factor which determines the use of this plea. The
availability of forensic psychiatrists, the laws of the state, the attitudes
of the community or the offender's social or economic class may be
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more critical variables. In many jurisdictions, for example, it would
be quite unlikely that an uneducated negro would plead insanity and
even more unlikely that he would be found not guilty by reason of in-
sanity.
As in the case of therapeutic abortion, the psychiatrist has no scien-
tifiic guidelines to help him determine who should be excused and who
should not. In the insanity trial the psychiatrist must judge an offender's
responsibility for a particular act. The assignment of personal respon-
sibility is more correctly based on philosophical or moral rather than
scientific considerations. Every citizen has an opinion about this issue
and it is unlikely 'that psychiatrist's training or experience provides
him with any special expertise. In some ways the psychiatrist has
more difficulty in making decisions aboutf personal responsibility than
the ordinary citizen. As a scientist the psychiatrist may be a hard
determinist but in his day to day practice he knows that if he is ever
going to help people overcome their difficulties he must constantly
implore them to assume responsibility for their actions. When treating
patients the psychiatrist tries to teach them to be totally accountable
for their thoughts, actions and dreams. This is true even when the
patient is considered to be mentally ill and even when his behavior
is believed to unconsciously determined. It is only when the psychia-
trist enters the 'courtroom that he is asked questions which tempt him
to forget his own teaching.
What seems to happen in the criminal insanity trial is that psy-
chiatrists of different value orientations examine the same patient and
agree about psychiatric questions but disagree about moral questions.
Psychiatrists generally agree when asked about the nature of the of-
fender's disturbance and about the kind of treatment which might lead
to his rehabilitation. When they are asked to comment upon the ques-
tioil of the offender's responsibility for his behavior, however, psychia-
trists answer this question in terms of their own belief systems. The
psychiatrist who is politically liberal, psychoanalytically oriented and
deeply concerned with social justice will be more likely to find a given
offender non-responsible than the psychiatrist who is more politically
conservative, more biologically oriented and more concerned with indi-
vidual rights and privileges. °
To excuse a criminal offender the psychiatrist must somehow find a.
way of relating the highly arbitrary concept of mental illness to the
philosophical concept of responsibility. The legal rules which are sup-
posed to guide the psychiatrist to a.rational definition of this relation-
ship are based on a presumption that mental illness is a clearly definable
entity. I and many other psychiatrists have repeatedly emphasized that
it is not. Even if we had more objective criteria for determining
mental illness we would still have no means whatsoever of determining
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whether those we call mentally ill either regulaly or even occasionally
fail to recognize the moral implications of their behavior. The Mc-
Naughten and Durham Rules are based on totally erroneous notions
of the nature of human suffering. Actually there is probably a stronger
case for arguing that social factors such as poverty or race, whose
effects are easier to study and measure, should be given more weight
in mitigating responsibility than the weight currently given to psycho-
logical factors.
When a psychiatrist testifies in a criminal insanity proceeding he
must either deceive himself or he must deceive others. Probably the
majority of forensic psychiatrists deceive themselves. Many believe
that mental illness is an affliction and have convinced themselves that
their expertise in human behavior enables them to determine at pre-
cisely what point one is ill enough to be non-responsible. Other psy-
chiatrists know better, but they will participate in insanity proceedings
for the sole purpose of pursuing humanistic goals. Sometimes they
agree to testify in order to help the offender avoid the death penalty.
Usually the psychiatrist who testifies on the side of the defendant has a
strong commitment towards tempering the harshness of punishment in
general.
As is the case with excuses for pregnancy, the psychiatric excuse
for criminal behavior also helps to preserve the status quo. Finding
selected offenders non-responsible and sometimes non-punishable is
in a sense a "liberal" solution to a social problem. It represents a shab-
by compromise which permits efforts to temper the harshness of pun-
ishment for a few mentally disturbed offenders but which allows the
society to ignore the plight of the mass of offenders. Like most com-
promises with oppressive systems, it has failed to yield much humanistic
gain. By investing an incredible amount of energy in trying to help a
tiny group of offenders, psychiatrists have done little more than lend
our correctional system a deceptive facade of decency. When the
psychiatrist helps the insane offender escape punishment, he actually
strengthens the current system of correctional justice. The public,
spared the agony of watching the mentally ill be punished, is more
willing to tolerate the merciless and' irrational abuse directed towards
the ordinary offender.
An enormous amount of psychiatric zeal and energy has been in-
vested in the issue of criminal responsibility. This unfortunately has
drained the profession's attention away from the more critical issues
of reforming our current system of correctional justice and of treating
offenders. The contribution of psychiatrists to reform in our correc-
tional system is not remarkable. This is largely because we have
diverted our attentions to what seems to be a humanitarian pursuit
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which turns out to be nothing more than activity which strengthens
the status quo.
So much energy has been invested, so much emotion spent and so
much talent wasted in dealing with the issue of criminal responsibility
that one observer has referred to it as psychiatry's "Viet Nam." The
solution of this problem seems little different from what seems to be
(at least as I write this in the Spring of 1970) the most expeditious
solution to the Viet Nam War. We should immediately withdraw.
If the psychiatrists simply withdrew from any involvement in deter-
mining criminal responsibility, neither they, the law, nor the mass of
offenders would suffer. Psychiatrists would then have the opportunity
to divert their interest to the more important questions of treating
offenders and of trying to create a more humane correctional system.
Those administrators of our correctional system including attorneys,
would have more awareness of and more time to deal with the real
issues of crime in our society. Perhaps a few offenders would suffer
if they could not find a psychiatrist to testify they were insane. This
might be a critical factor in those instances in which criminal convic-
tion could result in the offender's death. But it must be noted that
the death penalty has not been carried out in American society for a
long time. Nor would those offenders who were given long prison
sentences be worse off than they are now. Many offenders who are
found insane spend almost as much time in custodial institutions as
those who are found criminal. Furthermore, if we tried to make real
reforms in our correctional system, no offender would ever have to
spend an inordinate amount of time in any dehumanizing environment,
whether it be called a hospital or a prison.
Withdrawal from the criminal insanity trial would not deprive the
psychiatrist of an important role in the correctional process. If it were
assumed the goal of society was to fehabilitate all offenders who could
be helped and to control all those who were dangerous to the society,
the psychiatrist could be used as a resource person whose advice would
serve the judge or jury in the question of disposition. If punishment
were not the major issue, all offenders, including those believed to be
emotionally disturbed could be tried in court for the sole purpose of
determining if they had actually committed an illegal act. Mental
illness would not mitigate criminal intent. "All persons found to have
committed a crime (except-for where mens rea does not exist for rea-
sons other than mental illness) would simply be considered fully re-
sponsible. Psychiatrists and other behavioral scientists would then be
able to confine themselves to the legitimate role of treating offenders
and of assisting society in determining what is to be done with the
offender.
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Psychiatry and the Draft
Decisions to excuse selected individuals from the obligation to serve
in the armed forces are generally made by physicians employed by
government agencies. These doctors are quite likely, however, to be
influenced by communications they receive from other physicians. If
the patient's own doctor, for example, sends the induction center a
letter stating that the patient has a serious heart ailment, the draft
board physician will be likely to respect that advice and examine the
patient carefully. A similar situation exists with regard to psychiatric
excuses. If a young man appears for a selective service physician ex-
amination with a letter stating that he has a mental illness which makes
his capacity in the military forces seem questionable, that young man
will receive special medical attention. His chances of being excused
from military service will be far greater than that of the average
"draftee".
There have probably always been questionable uses of medical and
psychiatric excuse-giving with regard to military service. The issues
raised by such practices however seem most agonizing in the highly
unpopular Vietnamese War. In the last five years I have not had a
male patient eligible for military service who did not ask me to assist
him to stay out of the service. Every day someone comes in to our
clinic requesting assistance in avoiding his military obligations. Like
any other psychiatric excuse, the excuse from military service is most
likely to be granted to the sophisticated, to the aggressive and to the
wealthy. To receive such an excuse, one must know something about
how draft boards operate, one must be willing to approach a psychia-
trist, one must be willing to define some of his problems in living as
an illness, and often one must have enough money to stay in therapy
long enough to convince the psychiatrist that he is disturbed.
One of my patients who returned from his physical examination
and was found unsuitable for military service, at least partly on the
basis of the letter I had written for him, expressed the situation as
follows: "It was awful. There were about 20 of us who asked to talk
to the psychiatrist to try and convince, him we were unfit. And some of
those guys really looked pretty sick and messed up. But it was only
the three of us who had letters who got out. The ones who didn't
have a letter from a psychiatrist never had a chance."
It is hard to know what makes a draft board accept one candidate
and reject another. It is also difficult to know how they evaluate letters
from psychiatrists. Some psychiatrists will write letters in which they
plainly state that their patients are too sick to serve in the armed
forces. Others, like myself, will rarely say anything more than that a
patient is in therapy and that it might be useful for all concerned to
have him examined by a psychiatrist. In my own experience, almost
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any kind of letter from a reputable psychiatrist seems to have a pro-
nounced effect in helping the young person avoid his military obligation.
The process of excuse-giving with regard to the military services
has agonized and corrupted the psychiatric profession. Many psychia-
trists strongly oppose the war and will do whatever they can to keep
their patients from risking their lives in what patient and doctor alike,
view as an immoral conflict. It is likely that some psychiatrists have
lied in order to help their patients escape the draft. If he is not biased
the psychiatrist finds it difficult to make an honest determination that a
given individual is too emotionally disturbed to serve in the military
Quite often the patient's emotional disturbance is itself created by a
fear of military service. When the patient requests an excuse, the psy-
chiatrist can, as I have chosen to do, write only a very neutral letter
suggesting that draft board physicians themselves make a determination
of the candidate's suitability In the words of our youth, however,
this is a "cop-out." It does not absolve the psychiatrist's guilt. He is
still contributing to the very selective excusing of some individuals who
happen to have been born under more fortunate circumstances than
others.
While the psychiatrist who provides excuses to young men wishing
to avoid military obligations may feel that he is striking a blow against
the establishment and furthering radical reform, his efforts actually
he'p the selective service system to function with greater stability and
smoothness. The young men who are deferred for psychiatric reasons
are those who would have confronted the system. Often they hold radi-
cal viewpoints to begin with. When they are deferred those who run
the system are able to comfort themselves with the thought that they
are simply keeping out people who are unfit for service and they may
also feel reassured that it is the radical student who often seems unfit.
Our population is large enough so that there are still enough young men
who can be drafted to fight the war. By selectively excusing a few,
psychiatrists have contributed to the situation in which useful confron-
tation and dissent have been avoided. There is also reason to question
whether we have helped those patients who have used our services. One
cannot help but wonder if they would have been better off m the service,
in a foreign country or by fighting their cause and going to jail.
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